M. Clement Gras

Ater - Doctorant en Économie

Sciences économiques

Affectation(s)

EES : École d'économie de la Sorbonne

Domaines d'expertise

Théorie des contrats et Mécanismes Incitatifs, Politiques de la concurrence, Économie politique et institutions, Economie des organisations

À propos de moi

I am a Ph.D candidate in Economics at the Paris School of Economics (PSE)and École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), under the supervision of Jean-Philippe Tropeano.

Formerly, I was a student (normalien scholarship) at the Economics and Business Administration Department of Ecole Normale Supérieure Paris-Saclay and completed the Analysis and Policy in Economics Masters program at PSE.

My research is at the intersection of organizational dynamics and information economics. It explores the impact of information asymmetries within and between organizations, employing a multidisciplinary approach to address complex issues. My motivation stems largely from my experience working for French and European public administrations during my undergraduate studies.

Currently, my research focuses on the effects of lobbying on the French lawmaking process, the interplay between communication and incentive constraints in delegation problems, and the role of vertical integration in online platform screening choices.

Recherche

Direction(s) de recherche

My research focuses on the role of information asymmetries within and between organizations.
- In my first paper, I investigate how communication and incentive constraints interact in a delegation problem using tools from information theory and mechanism design.
- My second paper (coauthored with Guillaume Thebaudin) delves into the European Digital Service Act and Digital market Act. We take a theoretical industrial organization approach to study hybrid (vertically integrated) platform screening.
- My last paper is coauthored with Rosanne Logeart and relies on data from the public transparency authority (HATVP). We provide new empirical evidence of the impact of informational lobbying in the French law making process.

Thèmes de recherche

  • Competition Policy
  • Contract Theory and Mechanism Design
  • Organization economics
  • Political Economy and Institutions

Directeur de Thèse

Tropeano Jean-Philippe

Enseignements

Mathematics (algebra, matrix calculus and optimization) with Prof. Biagio Speciale

Microeconomics (Competitive equilibrium and Market failures) with Prof. Stephane Gauthier